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recounting his many impressive 
achievements in the cause of 
Canadian unity and the country 
which he loved, David Bercuson 
builds a persuasive case for why 
"one of the most interesting 
Canadians of the twentieth cen-
tury" (p.xi) should be remembered 
by a generation that does not seem 
as sure as he was of what binds 
them together. 
David A. Lenarcic 
Wilfrid Laurier University 
* * * * * 
The Battle of 
Lundy's Lane 
On the Niagara in 1814 
Donald E. Graves. The Battle of 
Lundy's Lane: On the Niagara in 
1814. (Baltimore, Maryland: The 
Nautical & Aviation Publishing 
Company of America, 1993) 342 
pages, $24.99 US. 
B attle campaigns of the War of 1812 generally go unnoticed 
in the larger history of warfare, 
and in many cases are neglected 
altogether by students of military 
history. Thus it is a matter for 
celebration to find a superb 
history of one such battle, Donald 
Graves' Lundy's Lane. This book 
promises to revive our interest in 
the Anglo-American war in which 
Canadians played such a 
conspicuous part in the defence 
of their homeland. More than this, 
however, this study will stimulate 
the reader to wonder why the great 
conflict ever happened in the first 
place and, equally important, to 
ponder the legacies of this 
bloodiest of Anglo-American 
encounters. 
In one of the many quotations 
that pepper this book, with profit, 
Donald Graves cites C.P. Stacey's 
quip: "The War of 1812 is one of 
those episodes in history that 
make everybody happy, because 
everybody interprets it in his own 
way. The Americans think of it 
primarily as a naval war in which 
the pride of the Mistress of the 
Seas was humbled by what an 
imprudent Englishman had called 
'a few fir-built frigates manned 
by a handful of bastards and 
outlaws.' Canadians think of it 
equally pridefully as a war of 
defence in which their brave 
fathers ... saved the country from 
conquest. And the English are the 
happiest of all because they don't 
even know it existed." These 
assessments derive basically from 
the fact that the war tended to 
settle few if any differences exist-
ing between the United Kingdom 
and the United States. Although 
the diplomacy of the war, and the 
making of the peace which 
followed it on Christmas Eve 1814, 
fall outside of the focus of this 
book we generally conclude that 
the war altered hardly at all the 
relations between the two powers: 
what mattered most was the 
successful defence of Canada. If 
Loyalist settlement moulded the 
political character of the western 
frontiers of what was then the 
Province of Quebec, and shaped 
the destiny of Upper Canada, then 
surely the War of 1812 congealed 
Canadian attitudes against any 
future American invasion. Lundy's 
Lane was the anvil, and here the 
Americans decided to hammer 
their great blow. They did not 
succeed. 
On the sultry evening of 25 
July 1814, almost within sight of 
Niagara Falls, American troops 
attacked British regular forces 
that were assisted by Canadian 
fencibles and militia. It was a 
savage encounter, the most bitterly 
contested in the War of 1812. It 
began with parry and thrust, and 
continued into the night as troops. 
in pitch darkness, struck at the 
enemy with determination. What 
are now called "losses from friendly 
fire" were regular occurrences. The 
power of the Royal Artillery, 
advantageously placed on an 
eminence, wasted unprotected 
American infantry. Royal Scots and 
the 8th, 41st and 89th Regiments of 
Foot put up stout resistance. The 
officer commanding British forces 
was Canadian-born Sir Gordon 
Drummond, who was wounded, 
and his second-in-command was 
captured. By early the next day 
the British and Canadians had 
kept their ground, and the 
Americans retired toward Fort 
Erie, there to fight again in what is 
an important coda to this story. 
As a battle, Lundy's Lane offers 
the historian rich possibilities for 
research. Donald Graves has 
mastered all known sources. In 
particular he has used to great 
effect the official reports of 
General Drummond and those 
answering to him. Drummond 
faced two great adversaries, both 
of whom went on to subsequent 
distinguished careers in the United 
States Army-Major-General 
Jacob Jennings Brown and 
Brigadier-General Winfield Scott. 
The contribution of Lundy's Lane 
to the making of the careers of 
Drummond, Brown and Scott can 
be imagined, for all three went on 
to distinguished careers in the 
military and public service. 
Graves scrupulously scans the 
official reports of these field 
commanders against other 
evidence, and it is pleasing to see 
him check Drummond's enthusias-
tic report on his own success. 
Similarly, Graves notes numerously 
how E.W. Cruikshank lacked full 
access to documentation that 
would have given a more 
even-handed assessment of 
117 
1
Gough: <em>Lundy’s Lane</em> [Review]
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1994
British successes. As Graves 
demonstrates (p.242), "when the 
fighting ended, the [American] Left 
Division was in possession ofboth 
the hill and the guns and withdrew 
of its own accord." Thus, sadly for 
Canadian history, the Americans 
were not expelled from the rise, as 
Cruikshank claimed, but withdrew 
of their own accord. In demon-
strating this, and other wonderful 
particulars, Graves has used 
various diaries and newly-un-
earthed reports. One such is 
Private Shadrack Byfield's record, 
which provides one of the many 
narratives of the encounter. "We 
then moved on for the field of 
action," recollected Byfield of the 
41st Foot. "We had a guide with 
us and when we came near the 
field, our captain was called upon, 
by name, in a loud voice, to form 
on the left of the speaker. It being 
night, we could not discover what 
regiment it was. The guide 
positively asserted that it was one 
of the enemy. Our bugle then 
sounded for the company to drop. 
A volley was then fired upon us, 
which killed two corporals, and 
wounded a sergeant, and several 
of the men. The company then 
rose, fired, and charged. The 
enemy quitted their position; we 
followed and took three field 
pieces." (p.241) Collateral evidence 
from Thomas Jessup's memoir of 
the Niagara campaign sustains 
the view that the Americans 
withdrew of their own accord. The 
loser, in the end is historian 
Cruikshank, whom Donald 
Graves states was unaware of, or 
chose to omit, critically-important 
details. In reconstructing the last 
stage of the battle Graves has 
been circumspect in getting the 
sequence of events correct. He 
concludes that the bulk of the 
[British] Right Division did not 
reoccupy the hill, that companies 
ofthe 104thand89thfootregiments 
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remained nearby until early dawn 
allowed them to discover, with 
delight, the vacant ground and 
unattended field pieces, once 
previously theirs. In short, the 
Left Division "voluntarily gave up 
both the hill and the captured 
artillery." 
The battle is told in great detail, 
and the key characters enter and 
depart from the scene in a fashion 
characteristic of great historical 
narrative. The formalistic nature 
of early phases of the encounter 
offered great tactical opportunity 
to Scott and to Brown. But their 
successes, such as they were, were 
bought at terrible costs of life and 
human suffering. Skilful British 
Artillery work was bound to falter 
with successive changes of light 
and determined enemy charges. 
Deployments and redeployments 
of skirmishing parties by both 
sides in a confined field of battle 
intersected by fences and 
surrounded by thickets made 
hand-to-hand combat a regular 
feature of the battle. 
The costs, in killed and 
wounded, were staggering: the 
British line regiments together lost 
84 officers and men killed, 559 
wounded, 42 prisoners, and 193 
missing-a total of 878 casualties, 
that is, about 24 per cent of the 
British force engaged. Of the 
Canadian units, the Incorporated 
Militia suffered severely, losing 
142 of 402 all ranks. Others 
including the Glengarry Light 
Infantry got off lightly. In total, 
British losses amount to about 
800 men. American losses were 
similar, perhaps higher. Brown 
reported 860 casualties: more 
than twice as many American 
officers and men were killed in the 
encounter than British, primarily 
because of effective British 
artillery and heavier British 
musket ball. Some American 
units, particularly Scott's First 
Brigade, took terrible losses of 
thirty-five percent killed, wounded 
or missing. In truth, both sides 
suffered immeasurably, and the 
details of how death and dying 
occurred are the stuff of a John 
Keegan or a John Ellis. Here we 
have an excellent example of 
"sharp end" history. 
Donald Graves has provided 
an excellent description and 
analysis of field medicine in 
practice. Case by case he 
examines how field surgeons, such 
as William Dunlop of the 89th 
Foot, dealt with casualties. 
Amputation afforded an early, 
effective treatment, but had 
different theoretical foundations. 
Many casualties had suffered 
multiple wounds. Musket balls and 
artillery rounds did the greatest 
damage, and seventy-five percent 
of all wounds were inflicted in the 
torso and legs. Very few i~uries 
were caused by edged weapons. 
Jagged fragments of howitzer and 
shrapnel shells created severe 
damage at their entry points; 
canister bullets, very damaging, 
often passed through the body; 
slower-moving musket balls were 
deflected by bone, cartilage or 
muscle. Treating of various 
wounds involved various techniques 
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and instruments. Many wounded 
soldiers, such as the stoical 
Shadrack Byfield submitted quietly 
to losing an arm by amputation, 
and, in one of the many interesting 
snippets that pepper this book, 
we are told that Byfield, a weaver 
by trade, survived the amputation, 
had an artificial limb arranged for 
him, and pursued weaving in later 
years. We can marvel at the 
difficulties of the army surgeon, 
and as Dunlop put it correctly, 
"there is hardly on the face of the 
earth a less enviable situation 
than that of an Army Surgeon 
after a battle-worn out and 
fatigued in body and mind, 
surrounded by suffering, pain and 
misery, much of which he knows 
it is not in his power to heal or 
even to assuage. While battle lasts 
these all pass unnoticed, but they 
come before the medical man 
afterwards in all their sorrow and 
horror, stripped of all the excite-
ment of the 'heady fight.'" (p.175). 
Students of military history, 
and the War of 1812 in particular, 
will welcome the extensive 
bibliography of both primary and 
secondary works. The work 
contains numerous illustrations 
and boasts a serviceable index. 
The book is enriched by several 
good maps that help the armchair 
observer follow the campaign. A 
note on terminology and time aids 
the reader to follow the sequence 
of the battle, and to differentiate 
between British and American 
forces. Wisely, ancillary data has 
been relegated to four appendixes: 
Order of Battle and Strength, Left 
Division, United States Army; 
Order ofBattle and Strength, Right 
Division, British Army in Canada, 
25 July 1814; The Military Heritage 
of the Battle of Lundy's Lane: 
Honors, Awards, and Descendants 
of the Units of 1814; The Problem 
of the Guns (which army was in 
possession of the British guns at 
the end of the battle); and The 
Fate of the Battlefield, 1814-1992. 
In regards to the last of these, we 
learn, sadly (p.249) that little exists 
of the battlefield for the shaded 
lane of yesteryear is now a busy 
highway crowded with motels, 
eateries and souvenir shops. "You 
cansleep,"writesGravespoignantly, 
"in air-conditioned comfort near 
the same spot where the four-times 
wounded Jessup formed the 
Twenty-Fifth into a single rank to 
repel Drummond's last desperate 
attack ... "Nearby the Drummond 
Hill Cemetery tells a different tale, 
and in graves marked and 
unmarked lie British, Canadian 
and American bodies of this 
bloodiest of encounters on the 
Niagara. 
Barry Gough 
Wilfrid Laurier University 
* * * * * 
The Generals 
The Canadian Army's 
Senior Commanders in the 
Second World War 
J.L. Granatstein. The Generals: 
The Canadian Army's Senior 
Commanders in the Second World 
War. Toronto: Stoddart Publishing 
Co., 1993, 370 pages, $35.00. 
I n ending his review of Between Mutiny and Obedience (Times 
Literary Supplement, 13May 1994) 
makes an unfortunately valid 
point about much recent military 
historiography when he writes that 
the new sort of historian "can 
bear the gaze of fact only if it is 
veiled in a gauze of abstract ideas, 
woven from the busy looms of 
social science and political theory." 
He goes on to discuss whole 
wacademic lives being successfully 
lived between one archive 
and another, particularly 
between one conference and 
the next, spinning theories 
further and further detached 
from whatever it was that 
wentonatNeuvill-St. Vaast, 
Goose Green, Kuwait City 
... Reputations are won-
rarely lost-on the issue of 
Clausewitz's debt to Kant, 
or 'chaos theory and 
command'... Like the 
"eight-legged" essay of 
the Chinese mandarin 
examination, for which the 
highest marks were given 
to those candidates who 
most often alluded to the 
question without doing 
anything as indelicate as 
attempting an answer, 
military history ala mode 
is written through analogy, 
subtexts and alternative 
readings. 
Most of our military historians 
are free of Keegan's charges and 
this includes Jack Granatstein, 
even if he is an "academic." In the 
volume I have been asked to 
review, a "collective biography" of 
Canada's Second World War 
military leadership, the former 
Sandhurst lecturer, Keegan, 
would have considerable difficulty 
finding support for his thesis. 
It must be assumed that the 
general reader with no more than 
a passing interest in his country's 
history, military or other, may 
still believe naively (and in spite of 
the twisted efforts of manipula-
tive media people with revisionist 
axes to grind) that the men who 
led the men in '39-'45 wore the 
mantle of heroic leadership with 
appropriate modesty grounded in 
the firm conviction of the rightness 
of the cause coupled with the 
ability to lead with both 
inspiration and competence. 
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